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How is the tension between conflict and deliberation resolved in shareholder engagement? We 
address this question by studying shareholder engagement as a deliberative process with three 
stages: establishing dialogue, solution development, and solution implementation. We theorize 
that two interactionist mechanisms, deliberative interaction and the voicing of disagreement, play 
different roles at different stages of the process. We test our hypotheses with a proprietary 
database of 169 environmental, social and governance (ESG) engagements with US public 
companies over 2007–2012. We find that while deliberative interaction does not help advance the 
engagement process, it positively moderates the effect of disagreement in the solution-
development stage. By contrast, in the solution-implementation stage, deliberative interaction 
amplifies the negative effect of disagreement, thus hindering progress in the engagement. Our 
paper contributes to shareholder engagement, deliberation theory and interactionist organization 
theory by establishing that engagement effectiveness is an interactional achievement, shaped by 
both deliberation and disagreement.  
 
Key Words: shareholder engagement, responsible investing, corporate governance, deliberative 
democracy, symbolic interactionism 
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As regulatory authority over social and environmental challenges becomes increasingly 
fragmented, private and public actors need to find novel ways to collectively address these 
challenges (Bartley, 2007; de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015; 
Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Achieving this goal requires a 
deeper understanding of how stakeholder engagement can productively harness the tension 
between conflict and consensus to produce effective solutions to these challenges. This speaks to 
a growing scholarly appreciation of deliberation, a distinctive communicative practice 
characterized by mutual reason-giving and listening (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019), and 
originally introduced in the philosophical and political science literatures on deliberative 
democracy  (Dryzek, 2010; Dryzek et al., 2019; Elster, 1986; Fung, 2007; Habermas, 2018). 
More recently, the traditional focus of the deliberative democracy literature on seeking rational 
consensus (Habermas, 1984; 2018) has been criticized by deliberation scholars, who countered 
that an exclusive orientation towards consensus may not be appropriate for either corporations or 
NGOs. Instead, they have proposed alternative conceptualizations that leave more space for 
conflict and contestation (Arenas, Albareda, & Goodman, 2020; Brand, Blok, & Verweij, 2020; 
Schormair & Gilbert, 2020) but this research has not made clear how parties can maintain some 
measure of productive conflict without hampering deliberation. In other words, how is the 
tension between conflict and consensus resolved to produce effective deliberation in stakeholder 
engagement?  
We address this question with a study of shareholder engagement with US public 
companies. Shareholder engagement refers to the comprehensive process whereby shareholders 
attempt to change environmental, social and governance (ESG) corporate practices and policies 
by employing a broad range of tactics, including letter writing, shareholder proposals, and private 
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dialogue (Becht, Franks, Mayer & Rossi, 2008; Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 1998; Dimson, 
Karakas & Li, 2015; Eesley, DeCelles, & Lenox, 2016; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009; Van 
Buren, 2007). Since 1970 shareholders have been able to submit proposals on non-financial 
aspects to be voted on at annual company meetings. These proposals typically mark the 
beginning of a private dialogue between shareholders and the corporation, which is increasingly 
seen as the core of the engagement process (Becht et al., 2008; Carleton, Nelson, & Weisbach, 
1998; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2009). The process typically starts with an adversarial stance given 
that it is initiated by shareholders with a formal expression of a concern in a written letter. Over 
time, this can translate into more collaborative stance.   
Shareholder engagement is growing exponentially, partially due to the growth of 
responsible investing, as asset owners and asset managers sign-up to the UN-supported Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI): more than 3000 signatories with over US$ 100 trillion of 
Assets Under Management (Gibson, Glossner, Krueger, Matos & Steffen, 2020). PRI signatories 
commit to be active owners (principle 2) and thus start either internal stewardship groups (as 
BlackRock did with a group of more than 50 professionals), or work with specialized asset 
managers (like the one we studied). Empirical studies of engagement have shown that 
engagement has positive consequences on the corporate target’s shareholder value (Barko, 
Cremers, & Renneboog, 2018; Dimson et al., 2015) while the question of what makes for 
effective engagement – that is, engagement that leads to the implementation of mutually 
satisfactory solutions to the contested issue – has remained unexplored. Given the opacity of 
closed-door engagement processes and the resulting lack of publicly available data, our ability to 
understand the role of deliberation in private dialogue is limited, and so is our understanding of 
how shareholders and corporate managers can overcome an adversarial stance. There is, thus, a 
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need to develop an empirical as well as a theoretical account of how private dialogue can make a 
difference in the engagement process.  
In addressing this gap, we build on the interactionist tradition in sociology and 
organization theory (Barley, 1986; 2008; Collins, 2004; Goffman, 1967; 1983; Weick, 1995) by 
adopting the premise that the face-to-face encounters through which private dialogue unfolds 
matter as much as structural factors. In this regard, while the deliberative democracy literature 
has identified the structural conditions for deliberation in stakeholder dialogue, it has not 
specified what forms of interaction are more conducive to it. We conceive shareholder 
engagement as a three-stage process (establishing dialogue, solution development, solution 
implementation) and define engagement progress as the advancement from an earlier to a later 
stage. We suggest that two key interaction dimensions explain why some dialogues progress 
while other stall: deliberative interaction and disagreement. We develop hypotheses on how these 
dimensions affect dialogue at different stages of the process.  
We test our hypotheses with a unique proprietary dataset of 169 ESG engagements of one 
asset manager with US public companies over the period 2007–2012. As “stakeholder dialogue” 
can “constitute [an] empowered (and potentially deliberative) space” (Dryzek, 1999; 2010), 
engagements can be characterized by deliberative interactions or lack thereof. First, we find that 
while deliberative interaction per se does not significantly increase the likelihood of advancement 
in shareholder engagement, it mitigates the effect of voicing disagreement in the solution-
development stage. Second, we find that the expression of disagreement in the solution-
development stage of dialogue has a negative effect on advancement, even more so in a 
deliberative interaction. Thus, our results suggest that deliberativeness contributes to make 
upfront disagreement potentially conducive to the development of solutions, while protracted 
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disagreement erodes the progress already made, hampering dialogue progress and undermining 
the implementation of mutually agreed solutions and the successful completion of the 
engagement. Taken together, our findings contribute to the shareholder engagement literature, 
deliberative theory, and interactionist organization theory by outlining how certain combinations 
of conflict and collaboration advance deliberation. 
DELIBERATION AND DISAGREEMENT IN SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT  
To theorize the role of deliberation in shareholder engagement, we turn to the deliberation 
literature in political science, which has identified numerous criteria for effective deliberation and 
has debated the relative weight of each (Dryzek, 2010; Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli & 
Steenbergen, 2005). While there is debate on the ideal conditions for effective deliberation, we 
adopt the definition of deliberation as a distinctive communicative practice characterized, at its 
core, by mutual reasons-giving and listening (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019).1 This definition is 
consistent with the core of those offered by most deliberative theorists (Boyer, 1995; 
Mansbridge, 2015). For instance, as Fung and Wright (2003: 17) wrote, “in deliberative decision-
making participants listen to each other’s positions and generate group choices after due 
consideration. Participants ought to persuade one another by offering reasons that others can 
accept” (emphasis added). In sum, an established body of literature has theorized and tested 
experimentally (Schneiderhan & Khan, 2018; Sulkin & Simon, 2001) how deliberation helps 
parties overcome their adversarial positions, and thus can help us better understand how can 
shareholders and corporations engage effectively.  
                                                 
1 Depending on the specific goals of the deliberative process, other characteristics such as consensus, 
common good orientation, publicity, accountability, and sincerity might be appropriate but are not always required 
(Bächtiger et al., 2018). 
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Stakeholder engagement has been examined from a deliberative point of view in the 
political CSR literature (Ehrnström-Fuentes, 2016; Rasche & Esser, 2006; Roloff, 2008; Sabadoz 
& Singer, 2017; Unerman & Bennett, 2004). A conceptual study of shareholder engagement by 
Goodman and Arenas (2015) considered the role of deliberation in this activity, warning that 
shareholder engagement might fall short of the Habermasian ideal of inclusiveness. Others have 
adopted an agonistic approach that underscores how conflict and contestation play a productive 
role in deliberative processes (Arenas et al., 2020; Brand, Blok, & Verweij, 2020). Relatedly, 
Schormair and Gilbert (2020) propose an integrative approach based on a discursive value-
sharing process that does not consider value consensus as the necessary outcome of engagement 
processes, but suggests parties adopt an orientation towards “sufficient justification” which opens 
the door to a balanced mix of consensus and contestation.  
Normative theories of deliberation have introduced the idea of meta-consensus as a way 
to “relax” the expectation that deliberation is always characterized by the achievement of a 
rational consensus, and thus open the door to more contested form of deliberation (Dryzek & 
Niemeyer, 2006). Deliberative theory, indeed, has recognized that deliberation in stakeholder 
engagement requires confrontation and conflict in order for the parties to better understand each 
other and identify solutions for the contested issues, and refer to this as “agonistic deliberation” 
(Brand et al., 2020). Relatedly, Arenas et al. (2020) suggested that in a “contestatory 
deliberative” approach, parties are likely to disagree on “how” the process should be governed 
(procedural), “who” should participate (inclusiveness), “what” will be the impact of the 
agreement reached (epistemic), and what is the ultimate “purpose” of the initiative (ultimate 
goal). They argue that each one of these types of contestation can play a role in promoting 
deliberation, and that four related types of meta-consensus are necessary to enable productive 
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contestation in a deliberative process. Yet, their typology does not explain how the meta-
consensus “allows the management of contestation and how this combination increases 
deliberation and democratic quality”, and the authors call for more research on the topic (Arenas 
et al., 2020: 191). We propose that the seemingly contradictory effects of contestation can be 
resolved by attending to the nature of the interaction in the engagement process, and how they 
unfold at different stages of the process.  
Shareholder Dialogue as an Interactional Process 
In exploring shareholder dialogue as a process, we take it as a starting point that it is in the 
interaction between the parties that the tension between collaboration and conflict gets resolved. 
In doing so, we are drawing on a sociological and organizational tradition that treats social 
structures and organizations as interaction systems (Barley, 2008; Strauss, 1978), and the 
interaction instead of the actors as the basic unit of analysis (Goffman, 1983). We suggest that 
there might be specific forms of interaction that help parties overcome the tension between 
collaboration and conflict which is inherent to this process. Effective shareholder dialogue can 
thus be interpreted as what Schegloff (1982) calls an “interactional achievement”, whereby two 
opposing parties accomplish a “deliberative moment” characterized by intense awareness of the 
self, the other, and the issue (Sprain & Black, 2018: 336).  
In leveraging the interactional dimension of shareholder dialogue, we treat dialogue as a 
sequence of interactions with several stages. Each stage is a different situation that can be 
empirically identified and measured, and different stages may call for different forms of 
interaction. More specifically, we build on Ferraro and Beunza’s (2018) communicative action 
model of stakeholder engagement comprising three stages: establishing dialogue, framing, and 
deliberation. To study the interactional mechanisms that lead to effective deliberation once the 
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dialogue has been established, we unpack their final stage (“deliberation”) by distinguishing two 
separate stages of solution development and solution implementation. Similarly, Schormair and 
Gilbert (2020) conceive deliberation in stakeholder engagement as a process with five procedural 
steps. These steps include meeting reciprocity and generality preconditions; assessing stakeholder 
value conflict while identifying affected stakeholders and their concerns; establishing a reciprocal 
dialogue with affected stakeholders; engaging stakeholders in a process of mutual learning; and 
finding solutions that accommodate diverging stakeholder value perspectives. As with Schormair 
and Gilbert (2020), our stage model presumes that parties will be unable to reach a given stage 
without completing the previous one. At the same time, while all stages are necessary for 
deliberation in stakeholder engagement, our model focuses on Schormair and Gilbert’s (2020) 
last two stages —i.e. the ones taking place after the dialogue between parties has been 
established— and adds a third stage of solution implementation as a concrete and measurable 
indicator of actual effective deliberation. By focusing on the last two stages of both stakeholder 
engagement models while adding the final stage of solution implementation, we are bracketing 
some of the earlier stages so we can focus on the interactional component of deliberation. 
In sum, our proposed model theorizes effective dialogue as a process of three empirically 
identifiable and measurable stages which culminates with the actual implementation of mutually 
satisfactory solutions emerged from deliberation (Fig. 1). In the first stage (establishing 
dialogue), we include all the steps that enable parties to overcome a purely adversarial stance and 
start a dialogical process. This includes acknowledgement on the part of the company that the 
issues raised by the shareholders merit discussion, accepting the other parties as dialogical 
partner, and results in the achievement of a meta-consensus on how the dialogue would unfold 
(Arenas et al., 2020) and what the ground rules of the process would be (Schormair & Gilbert, 
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2020). In the second stage (solution development), the parties search for concrete solutions that 
satisfy (to a certain degree) all the parties involved. This stage of the process is less focused on 
developing mutual awareness and more on debating the merits of the different solutions that 
emerge from the process, as well as converging on a mutually agreed one. Finally, in the third 
stage of the process (solution implementation), parties aim at implementing the solutions 
identified, likely arriving at a satisfactory solution to the issue. We define an effective 
shareholder dialogue as one that completes the final stage, while we define dialogue as 
ineffective if it stops at earlier stages.  
 [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Deliberative Interaction 
Deliberative interaction refers to the ability of actors to discursively engage in the exchange of 
reasoned arguments to resolve disputes. A focus on the interaction is necessary because 
deliberation is not just any kind of discussion, but rather a situational accomplishment for the 
parties involved, that is, it results from the actions and reactions of the parties when engaged in a 
face to face setting (Goffman, 1983). Indeed, experienced facilitators of deliberative processes 
can readily identify “good” and “bad” examples of deliberation from video recordings 
(Mansbridge, Harzt-Karp, Amengual & Gastil, 2006). In these deliberative moments (Goodin, 
2008; Sprain & Black, 2018) parties engage in reason-giving exchanges, listen to the other party, 
and respect their views. 
Given the key role that reason-based disagreement play in the philosophical origins of 
deliberative practices (Dewey, 1922; Aristotle, 1984; Habermas, 1984; 2018) it is not surprising 
that most political scientists agree that “at the core of all theories of deliberative democracy is 
what may be called a reason-giving requirement” (Thompson, 2008). In interactional terms this 
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means that not any form of discussion between parties can be treated as a deliberative interaction, 
but only the ones where parties are providing reasons for their arguments. But why would reason-
giving help advance shareholder engagement? Political theorists argue that the exchange of 
reasons has both an epistemic and a legitimacy role. From an epistemic point of view, it is only 
through exchanging reasons that parties can better understand the issues, understand each other, 
and develop better solutions. From a legitimacy point of view, exchanging reasons will lead to 
more legitimate solutions.  
The idea that mutual listening and respect can lead to more productive social interactions 
is also well-established in sociology and organization theory. For instance, Scheff (1990) refers to 
interactions characterized by a deliberative interaction as “attuned” interactions. In an attuned 
state, people reach a high level of intersubjective understanding and can predict each other’s 
behavior and intentions (Hurley, 2008). This achievement enables parties to break down 
adversarial stereotypes, as well as build trust and commitment to the process (Ansell & Gash, 
2008). In the context of shareholder engagement, qualitative studies of the process have 
suggested the importance of heedful interactions in the process. As  Logsdon and Van Buren 
(2008: 361-362) wrote, engagement requires “entering into the perspective of another”, 
“respectful listening, and a proper tone for criticism.”  
In light of these arguments, we expect the following baseline hypothesis to hold at each 
stage of the shareholder engagement process: 
H1: Deliberative interaction between active shareholders and corporate leaders has a 
positive effect on the engagement’s likelihood of progressing to the next stage. 
Deliberative Interaction and Issue Disagreement 
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While hypothesis 1 captures the baseline expectation of deliberative democracy theorists, 
deliberative interaction may not be enough to advance in shareholder dialogue, as parties need to 
arrive at a degree of agreement on the contested issue. Deliberativeness and disagreement denote 
distinct social qualities, as the degree to which an interaction is deliberative in any social 
encounter does not reflect the degree of agreement or disagreement. For instance, two opponents 
in a labor negotiation could be engaging deliberatively but still disagree on the issues being 
discussed. Deliberativeness and disagreement, we argue, should not be conflated in one concept, 
and their joint effect on the engagement will be contingent on the stage of the process. This 
approach is consistent with the call by Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019) to explore how 
deliberative practices are contingent to specific contexts and goals.  
In disentangling the effects of deliberativeness and disagreement, we first theorize that 
when the dialogue between investors and corporate leaders is not characterized by a deliberative 
interaction, disagreements can be interpreted as a threat, or as an expression of mistrust, thereby 
eroding the parties’ inclination to take the other’s point of view. Thus, our baseline expectation in 
the context of shareholder dialogue is that the independent effect of disagreement on the 
likelihood of progress in the dialogue would be negative. By contrast, if participants are engaged 
in a deliberative interaction and strive for mutual understanding, conflict and disagreement can be 
constructive and yield positive outcomes. Indeed, the attunement literature has made clear that 
when partners are deliberative, conflict serves the purpose of change and mutual adjustment 
(Scheff, 1990). For instance, failed interactions can be followed by different sequences of actions, 
depending on the partners’ willingness to maintain and repair the relationship by reestablishing a 
deliberative interaction, perhaps even on the fracture itself (Braithwaite, 1989; Strang & 
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Braithwaite, 2017). Discussing the fracture works as a form of restorative justice in the 
relationship and has the effect of resynchronizing partners.2 
Nevertheless, even if expressed within a deliberative interaction, disagreement would 
have different consequences at different stages of the process. Specifically, in line with the 
insights from the integrative deliberative perspective (Schormair & Gilbert, 2020), we 
hypothesize that if disagreement is brought up earlier in the dialogue, it allows both parties to 
convey their beliefs, their constraints, and to propose new frames that are acceptable to both, 
culminating in the joint development of concrete solutions. The ability to successfully resolve 
disagreement and exhibit flexibility then reinforces the initial sense of trust, and propels the 
engagement forward. We then expect disagreement to have a positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between deliberative interaction and engagement progress in the solution 
development stage, i.e., before parties have converged towards the identification of mutually 
satisfactory solutions. In a deliberative setting, disagreements can in fact be addressed through 
discussion, which is likely to enable progress in the dialogue. Therefore, we expect the following 
hypothesis to hold: 
H2a: Before mutually satisfactory solutions have been identified, disagreement positively 
moderates the positive effect of deliberative interactions on the engagement’s likelihood of 
progressing to the next stage of the dialogue.  
Once solutions have been developed, however, we expect the aforementioned relationship 
to reverse. That is, we expect late-stage disagreement to undermine successful completion of the 
                                                 
2 In earlier versions of the article we hypothesized an independent effect of disagreement on the 
engagement’s likelihood of progressing to the next stage. We dropped it to both clarify the theory and streamline the 
article. The independent effect of disagreement is not central to our theoretical insight, i.e., the interaction between 
deliberative interaction and disagreement, and the contingent role it plays at different stages of the engagement. 
Furthermore, we did not find statistical support for such effect. 
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engagement, since in an advanced phase of the relationship the effects of disagreement may be 
more disruptive than those in early stage. Disagreements calling into question the progress 
already made, once the parties have laboriously come to a set of concrete solutions, undermine 
the trust that a party might have developed with the other one, and will be perceived as reneging 
on the agreement. For instance, in Ferraro and Beunza’s (2018) analysis of the engagement 
between ICCR and Ford Motors, after parties had agreed on emissions reduction as a viable 
solution, the car maker antagonized the shareholder activists by suing the state of California in 
2006 for setting overly ambitious emissions standards, thus hampering engagement progress.  
Continued and protracted disagreeing after a solution has been developed may signal a lack of 
interest on the part of one of the parties to adequately listen to the other. Furthermore, it may 
suggest that one party strategically silenced their disagreement in the prior conversations so as to 
create a false atmosphere of cordiality. Finally, late disagreement calls into question the potential 
exchange of commitments that were done in the previous meetings, pointing to a renegotiation of 
the truce that emerged and raising the concern that one party is opportunistically exploiting the 
other. Indeed, the literature on social cognition and emotions made clear that when one of the 
parties expresses views that are inconsistent with the agreed course of action, the other party 
attributes such inconsistency to deliberate intent, causing anger, distrust and negative feelings 
towards the partner (Healey, Vuori, & Hodgkinson 2015; Lepine & Van Dyne 2001). This 
eventually undermines coordination and cooperation (Barsade, Ward, Turner & Sonnenfeld, 
2000; Healey et al., 2015), rendering the engagement ineffective at producing meaningful policy 
or practice changes. Therefore, we expect the following hypothesis to hold. 
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H2b: Once mutually satisfactory solutions have been identified, disagreement negatively 
moderates the positive effect of deliberative interactions on the engagement’s likelihood of 
progressing to the final stage of the dialogue.  
METHODS 
Data 
To test our hypotheses, we analyzed data from a large asset manager with more than $1.2 trillion 
in assets under advice ($600 billion in assets under management) at the time of writing. This 
investor was one of the founding members of PRI, and it remains one of the most influential 
active owners when it comes to promoting and developing ESG standards at portfolio firms 
through active shareholder engagement. In this process, they engage in dialogue on ESG issues 
with target companies around the world via letters, emails, telephone conversations, and 
especially direct face-to-face dialogue with senior management. In this paper, we rely on their 
extensive proprietary database of their ESG engagements with US public companies for the 
period 2007–2012.  
The investor engages companies through a four-step process. After identifying an issue 
and targeting a specific company, the first milestone is to raise concerns regarding ESG issues 
identified internally as engagement themes. Companies can react to the investor’s concerns in 
three different ways: they can deny, delay or acknowledge the concern. Company 
acknowledgement occurs when a company agrees that an ESG concern deserves attention and 
corrective action, thus enabling the engagement relationship to progress to the strategy 
development phase, which involves closer collaboration to address problems and jointly 
determine changes to policies and practices. The iterative process involves solidifying a 
company’s commitment to addressing the issues of concern and creating credible strategies to 
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address them. After strategy implementation, the fourth and last milestone, the investor continues 
to monitor the company to ensure the process is properly completed. The final US engagement 
dataset includes 56 instances of issue identification, 35 instances of raising concerns, 33 instances 
of company acknowledgement, 29 instances of strategy development, and 16 instances of 
strategy implementation. Only 17% of the engagements led to the development of mutually 
satisfactory solutions and less than 10% to their implementation, suggesting that the transition 
from the acknowledgement of an issue to the development of a strategy and eventually to its 
implementation is an important hurdle and therefore ideally suited for our study. Thus, in line 
with our three-stage process of shareholder dialogue, we focused our attention on the last three 
milestones, and tested our hypotheses on two transitions: from the acknowledgment of the 
existence of an ESG issue to the development of a strategy to address it, and from this milestone 
to the implementation of the identified solution. 
The engagement database includes milestone dates on each one of the engagements; 
dates, text and notes of all incoming and outgoing emails and letters exchanged in the meantime; 
and extensive notes for all telephone calls, conversations, and meetings with executives. These 
reports are the key data source we coded to measure deliberative interaction and agreement of the 
interaction chain. In our data, a milestone marked the end of each stage. The status of a milestone 
was considered “pending” the day an engagement stage began and “complete” the day it had been 
achieved, at which point the status of the next milestone was updated to “pending.” Each 
engagement can last from a few months to three or more years. In our sample, engagements 
lasted, on average, about 1.5 years; on average, 55 days elapsed between initial contact and the 
first discussion about ESG issues, an additional 108 days elapsed before companies 
acknowledged focal issues, a further 239 days elapsed before a credible strategy was developed, 
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and an additional 128 days elapsed before the strategy was implemented. We organized our data 
in an engagement database by firm and issue. The final sample consists of 169 ESG engagements 
with 77 US-based publicly traded firms.  
Dependent Variable 
Our model of deliberative dialogue in shareholder engagement posits a three-stage process, with 
the second stage culminating with a substantive solution to the issue of concern, and the third 
with the implementation of the solution. To measure shareholder engagement progress, we first 
mapped the investor’s engagement milestones on our process model (Fig. 2) and constructed two 
dependent variables: the first measuring advancement to milestone three in our database (strategy 
development), and the second measuring advancement to milestone four (strategy 
implementation). We focus solely on these last two milestones because the first (raising 
concerns) does not require any action from the corporate side. The company acknowledgement 
milestone is the earliest milestone that depends on corporate action, but it is limited to the 
company’s acknowledgement of the issue. Thus, following our model, we assigned solution 
development a value of 1 when the company has shown a commitment to solving the problem 
and defined potential solutions (strategy development milestone), and 0 otherwise; similarly, we 
assigned solution implementation a value of 1 when the company successfully implemented the 
new ESG practices and policies (strategy implementation milestone), and 0 otherwise.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Key Independent Variables 
To test our hypotheses, we coded our data in two steps. In the first step, one of the authors 
independently coded 380 investor notes on meetings and face-to-face conversations (78%), phone 
conversations (17%), and emails and letters exchanged (5%) with executives, totaling 98,500 
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words. In the second step, the authors collectively prepared a coding manual (see supplementary 
materials online), and then a second co-author and two research assistants not involved in the 
project independently coded the same 380 notes for deliberative interaction and issue 
disagreement. 
To assess and distinguish between deliberative interaction and disagreement in the 
engagements, we first coded the interaction ˗ regardless of whether it happened in a meeting, a 
telephone call, by email or letter exchange, as described in each of the note ˗ as deliberative, 
mixed or neutral, or non-deliberative. This approach is consistent with the practice of coding 
deliberation in parliamentary setting used by political scientists (Bächtiger & Parkinson 2019). In 
that context, scholars have developed a protocol to evaluate the Discourse Quality Index 
(Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli & Steiner, 2003). In the context of shareholder engagement, 
we coded each one of the investor notes assessing whether the interaction described was 
deliberative (with value of 1) when corporate managers appeared to be willing to engage in 
dialogue, share relevant information, discuss investors’ concerns, and provide reasons for their 
positions, while both parties appeared willing to listen to the other party, respect their views, use 
a proper tone for criticism, and change their minds. We coded interactions as mixed (with value 
of 0) when partners switched between open and closed attitudes, between listening and reasons 
giving and defensive or offensive behaviors. We coded interactions as neutral (also with a value 
of 0) when it was impossible to determine partners’ attitudes due to a lack of sufficient 
information about the interaction. Finally, we coded engagement interactions as non-deliberative 
(with a value of -1) when corporate managers appeared unwilling to engage in dialogue, share 
relevant information, discuss investors’ concerns, or provide reasons for their positions, while 
both parties jumped abruptly from one topic to another and/or challenged each other, appearing 
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unwilling to listen to each other, show respect for the other party's views, use a proper tone for 
criticism, and be open to change their minds. We computed deliberative interaction before a 
milestone as the sum of deliberative interaction scores that took place before the milestone’s 
achievement. The final variable, deliberative interaction, is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 when the total score before a milestone was strictly positive, and 0 otherwise.  
To code issue disagreement, we first identified all the issues discussed during each 
interaction, and then we coded whether investors and managers agreed on each of those issues. 
We coded issue disagreement as 1, 0, and -1 when the investor was dissatisfied or partially 
dissatisfied, when it was impossible to determine partners’ attitudes due to a lack of sufficient 
information about the interaction, and when the investor was partially satisfied or satisfied with 
the company’s actions or reactions, respectively. We summed the issue values and divided the 
sum by the total number of issues discussed during an interaction to calculate overall value of 
disagreement per interaction and we then summed the interaction values as a first measure of 
disagreement before a milestone. The final variable, disagreement, is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 when disagreement before a milestone is strictly positive, and 0 otherwise. 
Considering only interactions preceding a milestone’s achievement when computing deliberative 
interaction and disagreement avoids the problem of reverse causality.  
To ensure the reliability of our coding, we used the Stata’s kappaetc function to estimate 
various interrater agreement coefficients, their standard errors, and their confidence intervals, for 
more than two raters (four, in our case) and more than two rating categories. We weighted 
disagreement among raters with both linear and quadratic weights to differentially penalize 
disagreements based on their magnitude. We obtained high levels of interrater reliability on our 
key independent variables along all the different indices used in previous research (LeBreton & 
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Senter, 2008).We observed substantial levels of interrater reliability using linear weights ˗ Gwet’s 
AC coefficients of  0.765 for deliberative interaction and  0.753 for disagreement ˗ and almost 
perfect interrater reliability using quadratic weights ˗ Gwet’s AC coefficient of  0.844 for 
deliberative interaction and  0.903 for disagreement (Gwet, 2008; 2010). These results give us 
great confidence in the reliability of our coding of deliberative interaction and disagreement.  
Control Variables 
To isolate the effect of interactional dynamics on corporate change, we first controlled for 
engagement-specific variables that may affect how corporations react to shareholder engagement. 
We began by setting a baseline to control for the effect of past successful engagements. The 
variable previous successful engagements is a count of previous engagements between the asset 
management firm and the company that had reached the strategy development or strategy 
implementation stage. We then controlled for the breadth of the relationship by considering total 
engagements, operationalized as the number of concluded or ongoing engagements between the 
asset management firm and the company that had been initiated prior to the focal engagement. 
We also controlled for shareholder engagement themes with two dummy variables: 
environmental theme and governance theme. It is well-acknowledged that corporations are more 
responsive to governance and environmental issues than social ones due to clear and direct links 
with firm performance and shareholder value (King, 2008; Soule, Model, & King, 2013; Vasi & 
King, 2012).  
We furthermore include control variables to capture societal pressure to increase 
environmental, social and governance responsibility. We specifically built a database on public 
protests targeting US corporations during the period 2006–2012. We collected data on public 
protests directed at firms from newspaper data, which is the established source of mobilization 
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data in social movement research (Dyke, Soule, & Taylor, 2004; Earl, Soule, & McCarthy, 2003; 
Earl, Martin, McCarthy & Soule, 2004; McAdam & Su, 2002; King, 2008; Soule, Model, & 
King, 2013; Vasi & King, 2012). Following King’s (2008) study on corporate boycotts, we used 
daily news reports in five different national newspapers: The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, The Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times. We selected these 
specific newspapers to reduce the potential for (a) a description bias arising from biased and/or 
partial and incomplete descriptions of mobilizations (Earl et al., 2004); and (b) a selection bias ˗ 
such as a regional bias (King, 2008) ˗ based on what is covered by newspapers, since “what is 
covered by news is not a random sample of all events that took place” (King & Soule, 2007: 
423). 
Following standard practice in social movement research studying boycotts and protests 
(King, 2008; McDonnell & King, 2013; McDonnell, King, & Soule, 2015; McDonnell 2016; 
Wang & Soule, 2012), a research assistant searched Factiva to identify newspaper articles during 
the period 2006–2012 by using the following search string: <company name> AND <protest*>. 
A research assistant and one of the authors then independently read each of the 5896 returned 
article to assess whether (a) the article actually referred to a protest event, and (b) the protest 
event actually targeted a corporation in the sample. We counted as protests only events that 
“involved more than one person” and “happened publicly”, excluding any private events between 
activists and companies (Wang & Soule, 2012). We also coded the articles to obtain relevant 
information about each protest, including place, date, number and type of participants, issue(s) of 
concern, tactics used by protesters and police presence (McDonnell, 2016; Wang & Soule, 2012). 
We used this information to create two measures of protest influence: past protest, i.e., the 
number of unique protest events directed at the company during the year prior to the milestone, 
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and media attention to protests, i.e., the number of different newspaper articles mentioning a 
protest event in the year prior to the milestone (King, 2008). We used the natural logarithm of the 
article count to stabilize the variables’ skew (Vasi & King, 2012). 
We also controlled for declines in corporate reputation. According to King (2008), a 
decline in reputation experienced by a company prior to being targeted by boycotts makes 
executives more likely to concede to activists. Therefore, following King (2008) and in line with 
previous research on company reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Roberts & Dowling, 
2002), we computed the variables reputation index and reputation decline using Fortune 
magazine’s “US Top 100 Most Admired Companies” list. The variable reputation index takes 
value 0 if the firm was not ranked among the 100 Most Admired Companies that year; 1 if the 
company’s raw score on the 100 Most Admired Companies list was between 1 and 5; 2 if the 
company’s raw score was between 5 and 7; and 3 if the company’s raw score was greater than 7 
(King, 2008). The final variable, reputation decline, measures the change in the reputation 
index’s value from the year before a milestone was achieved. We reverse coded this variable so 
that a positive value denotes a decline in reputation, and a negative value signifies an increase in 
reputation. Since the Fortune “US Top 100 Most Admired Companies” list uses data from the 
previous year to compute the reputation raw scores, we did not lag the reputation index and 
reputation decline variables in any of the models that used them. Due to the way the variables are 
constructed, they are lagged by one year by default. 
We further controlled for overall media attention as an additional source of external 
pressure on a company to concede to shareholders’ requests. Past company media attention 
measures the number of articles returned by a Factiva search in the Wall Street Journal, New 
York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post and Chicago Tribune mentioning the targeted 
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company in the year preceding the milestone (King, 2008; Vasi & King, 2012). Besides media 
attention, we controlled for shareholder activism in the form of shareholder resolutions targeted 
at the company. To this end, we included the variable past shareholder resolutions 
operationalized as the number of shareholder resolutions directed at the company in the year 
preceding the milestone (Vasi & King, 2012).  We also include controls for common target 
industries of shareholder engagement. In particular, we control via two separate dummy variables 
for firms in the mining sector (Allen, Letourneau, & Hebb, 2012) and firms in the manufacturing 
sector (Dimson et al., 2015). 
We also included several firm-level controls as shown in Table 1. First, we included a 
variable that captures the degree to which a corporation has a progressive corporate culture. 
Following Vasi and King’s operationalization of the variable, we used KLD Research and 
Analytics data and aggregated KLD measures of community, diversity, employee relations and 
human rights strengths (Vasi & King, 2012). The variable progressive corporate culture varies 
between 0 and 4 and it takes a value of 0 if a company did not score high on any dimension of 
socially responsible corporate culture, and a value of 4 if a company scored high on all 
dimensions. We further included the variable environmental proactivity, which is operationalized 
as the sum of all KLD environmental strengths (Vasi & King, 2012). We then included a set of 
other firm-level Compustat data. We measured firm size as the natural log of a firm’s assets, and 
cash flow, calculated as the firm’s operating income plus depreciation value and amortization 
divided by the firm’s average total assets, to indicate the amount of excess resources a firm could 
use to eventually accommodate active shareholders’ requests. Finally, we measured R&D 
intensity as Compustat R&D expenditures divided by average total assets.  
Main Empirical Specification 
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Since the sample of companies engaged on ESG issues may not be random, we used a two-stage 
Heckman model, which is generally used in management literature as a way to account for 
sample selection bias in results (Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace, 2002; Shaver, 1998). In our model 
of deliberative dialogue in shareholder engagement, the results may be biased because active 
shareholders tend to select the companies they engage with based on some firm-level 
characteristics and public pressure dynamics. We therefore used a first-stage probit regression—
targeting selection model—to estimate a selection effect coefficient, λ or inverse Mills ratio, 
which represents the probability that a corporation will not be targeted for engagement by active 
shareholders. We then added λ as a control to the second-stage model to account for this selection 
effect. To run the first-stage probit model and to identify what drives active shareholders’ 
company selection decisions, we followed previous studies in stakeholder activism (King, 2008; 
King & McDonnell, 2015; McDonnell, 2016) and used any constituent of the Fortune 500 largest 
US companies during the period 2006–2012 as sample of control firms. The firms targeted for 
shareholder engagement by the focal asset management company are, in fact, large and publicly 
traded US companies.  
The final sample comprises 806 unique companies and 5,642 observations. In the model, 
we included independent variables that measure public pressure on companies and shareholder 
activism directed at companies in the sample. First, we included the variables past protests and 
past protests in industry. Grouping firms by industries using four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes enabled us to operationalize past protests in industry as the number of 
protests firms in the same industry received in the year preceding the start of the engagement 
(King, 2008). We then included past shareholder resolutions, reputation index and reputation 
decline to control for other characteristics that can make certain companies more likely to be 
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targeted than others. We finally included the number of analysts following the firm from I/B/E/S 
data, the entrenchment index as measured by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) from 
RiskMetrics, and firm size from Compustat (see Table 1 for a summary of all variable definitions 
by data source and model).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The typical second stage of the Heckman regression model is an ordinary-least-squares 
regression with a continuous dependent variable (Heckman, 2013). However, given the 
operationalization of our dependent variables (i.e., solution development and solution 
implementation) as variables that only take values of 0 and 1, we used logit regressions. 
Variations of the original Heckman regression model with dichotomous dependent variables in 
the second stage rather than ordinary-least-squares regressions have been successfully employed 
in previous studies of stakeholder activism (e.g., King, 2008). The main models in our study are 
therefore two different sets of logits, one for each of the two dependent variables of interest. We 
ran the two sets of models on specific sub-samples of the 169 ESG engagements of the focal 
asset management company with US corporations. In particular, the sub-sample for Model 1, the 
solution development model, is constituted by engagements that achieved milestones 2 or 3, i.e., 
engagements in which corporations acknowledged an ESG issue and engagements that succeeded 
further by also developing a credible strategy to address it, respectively. Selecting this sub-
sample enabled us to identify the variables that predict the likelihood that the parties will develop 
a solution in the shareholder engagement process (i.e., milestone 3), after the corporation 
acknowledged the issue raised by shareholders (i.e., milestone 2). The final sample consists of 62 
ESG engagements with 35 unique firms during the years 2007–2012.  
Analogously, the sub-sample for Model 2, the solution implementation model, is 
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constituted by engagements that achieved milestone 3 or 4, i.e., engagements that resulted in the 
development of a credible strategy to address an ESG issue and engagements that continued 
successfully by implementing the strategy, respectively. This sub-sample enabled us to identify 
the variables that predict the likelihood that the engagement process will effectively progress 
from the solution-development stage (i.e., milestone 3) to the implementation of a solution (i.e., 
milestone 4), the third stage in our three-stage theoretical model. The final sample consists of 45 
ESG engagements with 27 firms during the years 2007–2012. 
Given our choice to focus on the last two stages of the investors’ four-stage process, we 
also considered potential selection effects in the earlier engagement stage. Specifically, we ran 
two sequential selection models to predict the engagements’ likelihood to advance to the next 
stage. The first selection model includes all active engagements, i.e., engagements ranging from 
milestone 0 to milestones 1, 2, 3 or 4, and returns a second selection effect coefficient, λ2, which 
represents the probability that the concerns identified by the investors are subsequently raised, 
acknowledged by the company, and that a proper strategy is developed and implemented. We 
then ran a second selection model on the sub-sample of engagements that have reached 
milestones 1, 2, 3 or 4 using the λ2 coefficient to obtain a third selection effect coefficient, λ3, 
which represents the probability that concerns raised by investors are subsequently acknowledged 
and that a proper strategy to address them is developed and implemented. To ensure simplicity 
and parsimony in presentation, we do not show these results, but the models are available upon 
request. Finally, we ran the two second-stage logit models on our main dependent variables —
model 1 (solution-development model) and model 2 (solution-implementation model)— and we 
included the selection effect coefficient λ3 to control for endogeneity arising from selection bias. 
In both models 1 and 2, we clustered cases at the firm level to adjust the standard errors.  




Table 2 shows the results of the first-stage Heckman probit model. In line with previous research, 
larger firms with stronger reputations and less entrenched management were more likely to be 
targeted by the focal asset manager company for shareholder engagement, as well as firms 
previously targeted by public protests (Dimson et al., 2015; Gupta & Briscoe 2020; King 2008; 
Vasi & King 2012). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Tables 3a and 3b contain descriptive statistics and correlations for the second-stage 
Heckman logit regression models. 
[INSERT TABLES 3a AND 3b HERE] 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression models for the two dependent variables 
representing completion of the last two stages of our model of deliberative dialogue in 
shareholder engagement —solution development and solution implementation. Model 1 tests 
hypotheses 1 and 2a on the likelihood that parties in the second stage of the engagement process 
successfully arrive at developing a solution. Specifically, model 1.1 tests the effect of control 
variables, model 1.2 tests the independent effect of deliberative interaction and disagreement, and 
model 1.3 adds the interaction effect between deliberative interaction and disagreement. In line 
with hypothesis 1, deliberativeness has a positive —although not statistically significant— effect 
on the engagement’s likelihood to advance to the solution-development stage.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Furthermore, while our results suggest that disagreement negatively affects the likelihood 
that parties will develop a solution to an ESG issue, model 1.3, in line with hypothesis 2a, shows 
a positive and significant interaction effect of disagreement and deliberativeness in the 
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engagement relationship, suggesting that deliberativeness significantly mitigates the impact of 
disagreement. These findings are illustrated in figure 3, which shows the predicted probability of 
the engagement advancing towards the development of a solution, when deliberative interaction 
and disagreement range to one standard deviation below/above their means. Engagement 
relationships in which parties do not experience disagreement have high probabilities of reaching 
the solution-development milestone. While the probability that the parties will reach this 
milestone is 0.49 for engagement relationships in which partners are not deliberative, the 
probability rises to 0.67 in the case of deliberative parties. The probability changes greatly when 
the engagement is characterized by disagreement. In this case, the likelihood of developing a 
solution when parties experience and voice disagreement is fifty-two percent higher when parties 
engage in deliberative interactions (0.54) than when they do not (0.02), resulting in a steep 
positive slope when disagreement is present.  
These results show that the likelihood of developing a mutually satisfactory solution is 
five percent higher when parties experience and voice disagreement in deliberative interactions 
(0.54) than in absence of disagreements in non-deliberative interactions (0.49). Most importantly, 
when disagreement is present and voiced in deliberative interactions the likelihood that the 
engagement will advance towards the development of a solution (0.54) is only thirteen percent 
lower than in absence of it (0.67), against the forty-seven percent drop when disagreement is 
present and voiced in non-deliberative interactions (from 0.49 to 0.02).  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Model 2 in table 4 tests hypotheses 1 and 2b on the likelihood that the parties will 
complete the third stage of the engagement and implement the solution. Specifically, Model 2.1 
tests the effect of control variables, while models 2.2 and 2.3 test the hypotheses. Model 2.2 tests 
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the effect of the main independent variable - deliberative interaction, while model 2.3 considers 
the interaction effect of deliberative interaction and disagreement. The models do not support 
hypothesis 1. The deliberative interaction between shareholders and corporate leaders does not 
have a significant independent effect on the likelihood of solution implementation.  
On the other hand, model 2.3 does support the predictions of hypothesis 2b, showing a 
negative and significant interaction effect of disagreement and deliberative interaction in the 
engagement relationship. Disagreement in a deliberative interaction has a negative effect on the 
likelihood of the engagement to successfully advance towards the implementation of a solution.  
The findings of model 2.3 are illustrated in figure 4, which shows the predicted 
probability that the engagement will complete its third stage with the implementation of a 
solution, when deliberative interaction and disagreement range to one standard deviation 
below/above their means. Engagement interactions without disagreement have a high probability 
of completing the stage of solution implementation. In engagements without disagreement, the 
probability of reaching the implementation milestone is 0.36 when partners are not deliberative 
and rises to 0.70 when partners are deliberative. On the other hand, as predicted by hypothesis 2b, 
while the probability of reaching the implementation milestone is 0.61 for engagements in which 
parties are not deliberative and experience disagreement, the probability of reaching the 
milestone drops to 0.02 when shareholders and corporate leaders experience disagreement in a 
deliberative interaction.  
Overall, the support of hypotheses 2a and 2b is evident when we contrast the different 
effect of disagreement in the two stages, which can be measured by comparing the slope of the 
dotted regression line across figure 3 and figure 4. While the line slopes upward in figure 3, it is 
downward sloping in figure 4. This means that holding deliberative interaction constant, 
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disagreement increases the probability of advancement from 0.02 to 0.54 in the solution-
development stage, and it reduces that probability from 0.61 to 0.02 in the implementation stage.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Finally, we ran a number of robustness checks. First, we ran a second-stage logit analysis 
of our dependent variables on a set of dummy variables we created to test the interaction between 
deliberative interaction and disagreement: (a) deliberative and not-disagreeing, which takes a 
value of 1 when deliberative interaction takes a value of 1 and disagreement takes a value of 0, 
and 0 otherwise; (b) non-deliberative and not-disagreeing, which takes value of 1 when both 
deliberative interaction and disagreement take value of 0, and 0 otherwise; and (c) deliberative 
and in disagreement, which takes a value of 1 when both deliberative interaction and 
disagreement take a value 1, and 0 otherwise. Second, we ran the four models to move through 
the sequence of stages using the Stata’s heckprob function and clustering cases at the firm level. 
Stata’s heckprob function runs simultaneously a first-stage probit selection and a second-stage 
probit estimation so as to account for the bivariate normal distribution of the errors of the two 
equations, and returns adjusted standard errors and maximum likelihood estimates which 
properly account for selection effects. The results ˗ not reported but available upon request ˗ were 
consistent with the ones of the main models. Finally, we ran a sequential logit model which is 
specifically formulated for cases where the final outcome is the result of a sequence of stages, of 
moving from one stage to the next. A sequential logit analysis allows to test hypotheses across 
transitions by estimating simultaneously the entire model, and to decompose the effect of the 
explanatory variables on the final outcome of the process into the contributions of each of the 
transitions (Buis, 2010; 2011). Table 5 shows the results of the last two of the four stages of the 
sequential logit model. The results are consistent with our main analyses. Full results are 
running head: THE CONTINGENT ROLE OF CONFLICT 
30 
 
available upon request. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
DISCUSSION 
This paper aims at understanding the interactional mechanisms that enable parties in shareholder 
dialogue to manage the tension between conflict and consensus. To do so, we develop a model of 
shareholder engagement as a three-stage process that is shaped by two key situational variables: 
deliberative interaction and the expression of disagreement. This conceptual setup makes it 
possible to explore the different effect of deliberativeness and disagreement at different stages of 
the process. We hypothesize that deliberativeness contributes to engagement progress in both the 
solution development and solution implementation stages, and that disagreement has different 
moderating effects on the impact of deliberativeness: a positive effect before solutions have been 
identified, and a negative one once solution have been identified.   
Our findings can be summed up as follows. First, we find a positive —although not 
significant— effect of deliberativeness on engagement progress. While this result does not 
support the existence of an independent effect of deliberativeness on engagement progress, it is 
consistent with an integrative approach to stakeholder engagement shaped by both consensus and 
conflict (Levy, Reinecke, & Manning, 2016; Schormair & Gilbert, 2020). If deliberative 
interaction were the sole causal factor behind engagement progress, we would expect to see 
hypothesis 1 being confirmed, yet this was not the case. Our interpretation of this finding is that, 
by itself, deliberative interaction is not a sufficient driver of engagement progress because 
consensus between the engaging parties is not always possible. In the absence of this consensus, 
continued deliberation runs the risk of producing an infinite loop of argument exchange that stalls 
rather than advances engagement.  
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Second, while —contrary to our expectations— we find that disagreement has a negative 
independent effect on the likelihood that parties will develop a solution to an ESG issue, our 
results do show a positive and significant interaction effect of disagreement and deliberativeness 
on engagement progress in the solution-development stage (hypothesis 2a), and a negative and 
significant one in the solution-implementation stage (hypothesis 2b). Taken together, these two 
results imply that the effect of disagreement on engagement progress is negative in both stages. 
The finding might at first sight appear inconsistent with the recent turn towards a “contestatory 
deliberative” approach in deliberation theory, which suggests that contestation and conflict are 
necessary in deliberative processes (Arenas et al., 2020). Upon closer inspection, however, our 
findings represent only a moderate deviation from the tenets of contestation, for two reasons. 
First, our findings are limited to the late stages of the engagement process, while existing stage 
models of engagement make clear that conflict plays different roles at different stages. Schormair 
and Gilbert (2020) for instance, contend that “value conflict” is to be assessed at an early step of 
the process (second in a five-step scheme), while later steps should be focused on “enabling 
mutual learning” and “finding solutions”. Our theoretical model and empirical analysis are 
focused only on the last two steps. A second reason why our findings do not rule out the value of 
contestation is methodological: as we controlled for social movement activity (protests) in both 
the selection model and in the main regressions, our results are compatible with an important role 
for contestation and social activism. In sum, our work further specifies the integrative approach 
to stakeholder engagement by suggesting that conflict is less helpful when expressed outside of a 
deliberative interaction, when expressed in the late stages of the engagement, and when played 
out in face-to-face dialogue rather than in the more public and impersonal public arena.  
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Furthermore, the results from hypotheses 2a and 2b (the interaction effect) indicate that 
deliberativeness can transform disagreement into a less disruptive form of conflict in the 
solution-development stage of the engagement than in the solution-implementation phase. This 
interpretation is consistent with the interactionist literature on attunement, according to which 
“conflict will be constructive to the degree that the parties are attuned, and destructive when they 
are not” (Scheff, 1990: 7). In other words, as the engagement moves towards the implementation 
of solutions, expressing disagreement in a deliberative interaction might be interpreted as a 
greater breakdown in the relationship, and undermine the fledgling trust created. As a 
consequence, progress in the engagement might be more severely hindered.  
In sum, despite the inevitable limitations due to our data and design, which we discuss 
below, our findings lead us to reject simplistic explanations of engagement success as mere 
deliberative interaction, or the presence of conflict. Deliberative interaction may indeed be 
needed for parties to exchange their views, but our results suggest it is not enough. Furthermore, 
bringing up disagreement within the engagement dialogue may at some point be necessary, but 
our results suggest it is not productive in the last two stages. Finally, while our findings are 
agnostic as to which combination of deliberation and conflict proves most useful in the early 
stages of engagement, they remain consistent with the core tenet of the integrative approach to 
stakeholder engagement, namely, that what facilitates engagement progress is the nuanced 
combination of deliberative interaction and conflict.  
Contributions 
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This article contributes to advance our understanding of deliberation in shareholder engagement, 
to the development of the contestatory deliberative approach in deliberation theory, and more 
broadly, to interactionist perspectives in organization theory.  
Shareholder engagement effectiveness. Our work speaks to the growing literature on 
shareholder engagement that has alternatively focused on the effect of shareholder engagement 
on the target company (Barko et al., 2018; Becht et al., 2008; Dimson et al., 2015) and on the 
mechanisms explaining why only some engagement processes succeed through the use of case 
studies and with qualitative methodologies (Ferraro & Beunza, 2018; Logsdon & Van Buren, 
2009). In terms of the latter, our ability to generalize theoretical insights from case studies or 
consider the role of contextual factors is limited, and our article is the first as far as we know to 
empirically establish that the deliberative nature of dialogue matters for shareholder engagement 
effectiveness, even after controlling for selection effects and other contextual variables. More 
specifically, our research design allowed us to control for the effect of external activism, media 
attention, reputational dynamics, and other firm-level and issue-level heterogeneity. Furthermore, 
we addressed the sample selection bias, a key issue in shareholder engagement as companies are 
not randomly targeted, by using a two-stage Heckman logit model, thus mitigating endogeneity 
concerns arising from selection bias. Our results suggest that at least some of the positive direct 
effects attributed to engagement by existing case studies might be explained by selection effects. 
Likewise, by controlling for social activism (protests) we can better isolate the factors that really 
explain engagement progress. For instance, even carefully conducted empirical studies of 
engagement effectiveness in finance did not account for the role of social activism and thus might 
potentially be misspecified (Barko et al., 2018; Becht et al., 2008; Dimson et al., 2015).  
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The contingent role of disagreement in contestatory deliberation. Our article answers the 
call in the contestatory deliberative perspective (Bächtiger et al., 2009; Dryzek, 1999; 2010; 
Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007) to explore the contingent ways in which deliberative practices unfold 
in different contexts. Bächtiger and Parkinson (2019) suggest that deliberative practices should 
not be only studied as normative ideals but as communicative practices that are more or less 
appropriate to different contexts, adding that “various forms of deliberation depend on the goals 
of the engagement … and the institutional, cultural, and issue contexts in which the 
communication takes place” (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019: 153). In line with this contingent 
approach, and in the context of stakeholder engagement, the “agonistic deliberation” and 
“contestatory deliberation” approaches concur in claiming a key role for contestation in 
deliberative processes. Yet, they also call for more research exploring the conditions under which 
contestation advance deliberation: “While we have argued that contestation is necessary, the 
question of the appropriate level of contestation that an MSI can tolerate cannot be answered 
theoretically; but the factors on which this question depends would be worth analyzing with 
empirical research” (Arenas et al., 2020: 191). 
 Our study addresses this question both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretical 
point of view, we theorize dialogue as a three-stage process, building on prior research such as 
Ferraro and Beunza (2018) and Schormair and Gilbert (2020) that conceived engagement as a 
succession of stages. We both relate and contribute to this literature. Our model indeed only 
relates to the later stages of Schormair and Gilbert (2020). By doing so, we offer a parsimonious 
and empirically operationalizable model that is well-suited to tease out mechanisms of 
deliberation. By renouncing some level of detail for the sake of abstraction and generalizability, 
we contribute to the development of social theory that has the potential to be robust and 
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empirically generative (Healy, 2017). We also suggest that the stage of the engagement is a 
relevant contingency in the unfolding of the process, and that the combination of deliberative 
interaction and disagreement play a different role at different stages.  
Empirically, the literature’s findings on whether deliberative processes work are, at best, 
mixed or inconclusive (Baccaro, Bächtiger, & Deville, 2014; Chambers, 1996; Delli Carpini, 
Cook, & Jacobs, 2004: 336-37; Janssen, 2011; Ryfe, 2005; Sulkin & Simon, 2001: 812) and 
essentially depend on the context (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019). Habermas himself 
acknowledged these mixed results (Habermas, 2006: 420). Unfortunately, much of the empirical 
research on the topic is ill-suited to investigate contextual factors given its research design. Thus, 
one of our study’s main contributions is empirical, as we operationalize the key features of 
deliberation and study a deliberative process while controlling for numerous contextual factors. 
Our approach also offers a novel path for researchers studying deliberative processes empirically. 
Obviously, future research is needed to further test our model, not only in the context of 
shareholder engagement but also stakeholder and multi-stakeholder engagement. The increasing 
availability of textual data capturing various communicative practices will provide more 
opportunities to go beyond our coding approach (which was appropriate given the relatively 
small dataset), and towards computer-assisted ones (topic modeling, machine learning) which 
would work best with much larger datasets.  
 Advancing interactionist approaches in organization theory. Finally, this article advances 
the interactionist research agenda in organization theory by identifying the kinds of deliberative 
interactions that explain organizational decision-making. In one of the most recent studies in this 
tradition, Soderstrom and Weber (2020) explored why some sustainability initiatives succeed and 
were formally institutionalized in the company’s rules and procedures, identifying specific 
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situational qualities of interactions that effectively translate the fleeting interaction into formal 
rules. In line with this study, our conceptualization of deliberative interaction and disagreement 
adds to our understanding of the situational quality of interactions that can lead to organizational 
decision-making.  
In considering dialogue and deliberation from an interactionist perspective, our study 
brings together the literatures on deliberative democracy and symbolic interactionism. This 
approach can help scholars move beyond deliberation as a normative ideal and characterize 
instead the mechanisms and traits that drive real-world success in engagement. By combining 
deliberation with an analytical focus that takes the interaction as unit of analysis, our study is able 
to empirically differentiate the effect of disagreement on dialogue at various stages of the 
engagement process, thus moving beyond structuralist conceptions of engagement that boil down 
effectiveness to the interests and positions of the actors.   
Limitations  
Our study on how engagement parties manage the tension between conflict and 
deliberation is not without limitations. First, given our unique data and an analytical strategy that 
tried to capture selection effects, we were left with a small sample of engagements, and thus with 
limited statistical power. This may explain why some of our hypotheses received weak empirical 
support. The growth of the shareholder engagement phenomenon will offer more opportunities to 
test our hypotheses with larger samples of engagements and compare the results of these 
processes across different investors. A related limitation stems from our coding procedure. 
Following the work of sociologists studying social interaction in work settings, and instead of 
applying codes developed for parliamentary discussions (Steiner et al., 2005), we decided to 
develop a specific working definition of dialogue that was able to capture the idiosyncratic nature 
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of relationships between shareholder activists and corporate leaders. Thus, our coding is specific 
to our setting, and might not generalize to other contexts. Another limitation of our coding relates 
to our main independent variable, deliberative interaction: we coded both mixed and neutral 
interactions with a value of 0, despite the fact the two types of interactions are substantively 
different in nature. Furthermore, by coding cases for which it was impossible to determine 
partners’ attitudes due to a lack of sufficient information about the interaction (neutral 
interactions) as 0, we might have miscoded interactions that were actually non-deliberative 
(coded as -1) or deliberative (coded as 1), due to a lack of information. However, given the 
operationalization of deliberative interaction as a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when 
the sum of deliberative interaction scores that took place before the milestone’s achievement was 
strictly positive, we are confident that what we capture empirically is a conservative estimate of 
the overall deliberativeness of the relationship between firm executives and investors.  
Another limitation of our study is that our dataset is limited to the self-reported perception 
of the investor, and we do not know if the perception of corporate managers was different. 
Nevertheless, deliberative interaction is intersubjective in nature and we are reassured by the 
psychological evidence that, as such, it involves a reflection on both the self and the other within 
an interaction (Casciaro & Lobo, 2005; McFarland et al., 2013: 1608). Similarly, Rivera’s study 
of emotional energy in job interviews (Rivera, 2015) relied solely on the perception of the 
evaluator of the interaction, and not on the ones of the candidates.  
Finally, given the nature of our data, we cannot explore directly the micro-mechanisms 
explaining our findings. One potential explanation for the different strength of the effects of 
disagreement, which we cannot confirm with our data, is that expressions of disagreement during 
the solution-development stage prove less disruptive because they create opportunities for in-
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depth and multifaceted analyses of the issues at stake, while they do not have that effect during 
the stage of solution-implementation. A different but complementary explanation builds on the 
observation that deliberative interaction might generate a form of emotional energy as theorized 
in Interaction Ritual Chains Theory (Collins, 2004). Agreement, instead, is a purely cognitive 
process, and thus disagreement might work well in deliberative interaction because the parties 
benefit from a diversity of perspectives while being shielded from the negative emotional effects 
of conflict. To explore further the relative role of cognitive and emotional processes, 
experimental studies could establish the micro-foundations of deliberative interaction and 
disagreement and test our speculation that the former is primarily an emotional process while the 
latter a cognitive one, and the consequences of both.  
In sum, our study has not exhausted the theoretical and empirical possibilities that open 
up as we start considering the full complexity of studying dialogue, and future research should 
aim to capture this process also through other methods. 
CONCLUSION 
Our study aimed primarily at better understanding whether and how deliberative theory can help 
explain how corporations engage with stakeholders, and thus improve the parties’ ability to 
collectively address social and environmental challenges. Given the difficulty of empirically 
capturing deliberative interaction in the wild (as opposed to experimental setting) and beyond 
case-studies, it is not surprising that our findings are limited in nature, and future empirical work 
should test them across a variety of settings. Yet, even with this caveat, our study underscores 
that the role of deliberativeness and disagreement is contingent on the stages of the shareholder 
engagement process. Engagement professionals could leverage these findings in their practices, 
while scholars may be inspired to conduct more in-depth research on deliberative practices.  




To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2021.XX. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions by Source and Model 
     Variable name Definition Data source 




Dummy variable that informs the overall level of deliberative interaction 





database  Disagreement Dummy variable that informs the overall level of disagreement among active shareholders and corporate leaders before a milestone’s achievement 
 Deliberative and not-disagreeing 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when parties’ deliberative interaction 
takes a value of 1 and disagreement takes a value of 0, and 0 otherwise  
 Non-deliberative and not-disagreeing 
Dummy variable that takes value of 1 when both deliberative interaction and 
disagreement take a value of 0, and 0 otherwise 
 Deliberative and in-disagreement 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when both deliberative interaction and 
disagreement take a value 1, and 0 otherwise 
 Previous successful engagements 
Number of engagements that have reached the strategy development or 
strategy implementation phase before a milestone’s achievement 
 Total engagements Number of concluded or ongoing engagements between the investor and the company prior to the focal engagement 
 Environmental theme Engagement issue on environmental themes 
 Governance theme Engagement issue on governance themes 
External activism controls 
 Past protests Number of distinct protest events directed at the company in the year prior to the milestone year  
Factiva 
 Past protests in industry Number of distinct protest events directed at companies in the same industry 
 Media attention to protests 
Number of distinct newspaper articles mentioning a protest event directed at the 
company in the year prior to the milestone year  
 Past company media attention 
Company’s overall media exposure, measured as the total number of articles 




Number of shareholder resolutions directed at the company in the year prior to 
the milestone year  Riskmetrics 
 Target Industries Two dummy variables that control for the specific target areas of mining and manufacturing SIC Codes 
 Reputation index Company’s overall reputation among stakeholders in the milestone year  Fortune’s “US 
Top 100 Most 
Admired 
Firms” list 
 Reputation decline Change in the company’s reputation from the year prior to the milestone year 
Firm-level controls 
 Progressive corporate culture Company’s overall progressive corporate culture company in the milestone year  KLD 
 Firm environmental proactivity Company’s overall environmental proactive attitude in the milestone year  
 Firm size Natural log of assets owned by the firm Compustat 
Fundamentals 
Annual 
 Cash flow (Net income before extraordinary items + depreciation and amortization) / Average total assets 
 R&D R&D expenditures / Average total assets 
Other first-stage Heckman model controls 
 Number of analysts Number of analysts following the firm IBES 
 Entrenchment index Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index Riskmetrics 
running head: THE CONTINGENT ROLE OF CONFLICT 
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Table 2: First-stage Heckman Probit Model on Targeting 
Variables Coefficients Robust standard error 
   
Constant -4.64*** .59 
Past shareholder resolutions  .04+ .02 
Past protests  .32** .11 
Past protests in industry -.04** .01 
Reputation index .18*** .05 
Reputation decline .02 .08 
Firm size (log) .26*** .05 
E-Index -.16*** .04 
Number of analysts .01 .01 
   
Observations 5642.00  
Log pseudo-likelihood -371.11  
Pseudo R2      0.25  
   
Note. The table reports the results of the first-stage probit model, i.e. the characteristics of firms that are targeted 
by shareholder engagement. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company is targeted 
for shareholder engagement by the focal asset manager during the following year, and 0 otherwise. Control firms 
come from the Fortune 500 list of US companies over the period 2006–2012. The final sample is constituted by 
806 companies and 5,642 observations. Annual time dummies are included in the model but are not shown in the 
regression table. 
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1 









Table 3a: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrices of Independent Variables for Second-Stage Heckman Model 
on Solution Development 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Solution development 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00                
2. Deliberative interaction 0.81 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.21               
3. Disagreement 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.02 -0.26              
4. Deliberative and non-in-
disagreement 
0.53 0.50 
0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.52 -0.88             
5. Non-deliberative and non-in-
disagreement 
0.06 0.25 
0.00 1.00 0.02 -0.54 -0.22 -0.28            
6. Deliberative and in-disagreement 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.30 0.75 -0.66 -0.16           
7. Previous successful engagements 0.44 0.95 0.00 4.00 0.05 0.23 0.39 -0.32 -0.12 0.56          
8. Total engagements 3.00 2.20 0.00 9.00 -0.03 0.04 0.11 -0.12 0.03 0.17 0.47         
9. Past shareholder resolutions 4.63 4.72 0.00 19.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.20        
10. Media attention to protests (log) 0.27 0.70 0.00 2.79 0.02 -0.05 0.13 -0.08 -0.10 0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.60       
11. Reputation decline 0.00 0.81 -3.00 2.00 -0.16 0.25 -0.25 0.24 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.13 0.20 0.18      
12. Past company media attention 4.88 1.70 0.69 7.25 0.05 0.06 -0.16 0.14 0.04 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 0.49 0.43 0.24     
13. Progressive corporate culture 1.32 1.31 0.00 4.00 0.08 0.21 -0.02 0.10 -0.16 0.08 0.13 -0.22 0.18 0.30 0.13 0.48    
14. Firm environmental proactivity 2.42 1.31 0.00 5.00 -0.10 -0.22 -0.16 0.15 0.02 -0.36 -0.16 0.01 0.07 -0.05 0.00 0.41 0.23   
15. Environmental theme 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.11 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.15  
16. Social theme 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.18 0.00 0.08 -0.15 0.07 -0.06 -0.16 -0.05 -0.02 -0.19 0.16 0.33 0.25 -0.20 
17. Governance theme 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.45 -0.19 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.15 -0.16 0.14 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.10 -0.25 -0.12 -0.48 
18. Firm size (log) 12.99 3.79 7.84 23.82 -0.33 0.14 -0.24 0.30 -0.14 -0.21 -0.21 -0.32 0.44 0.43 0.26 0.05 0.10 -0.10 -0.03 
19. Cash flow 0.09 0.11 -0.39 0.25 0.14 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.13 -0.11 0.01 -0.11 -0.10 0.08 -0.05 0.23 0.12 
20. R&D 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.10 -0.18 0.18 -0.43 0.46 -0.07 -0.36 -0.16 -0.02 -0.23 -0.22 0.16 0.17 0.41 0.32 -0.19 
 16 17 18 19 20               
17. Governance theme -0.76                   
18. Firm size (log) -0.16 0.16                  
19. Cash flow 0.27 -0.32 -0.15                 
20. R&D 0.21 -0.06 0.02 -0.03                
Note. The table reports correlations among variables for Model 1’s sub-sample. The sub-sample for Model 1 is constituted by engagements that achieved at least 
milestones 2 and 3, i.e., engagements to which corporations first acknowledged and then responded by developing a credible strategy to address the issue of 
concern, respectively. The final sample is constituted by 62 ESG engagements with 35 unique firms during the years 2008–2012. 
 




Table 3b: Means, Standard Deviations and Correlation Matrices of Variables for Second-Stage Heckman Model on Solution 
Implementation 
Variable  Mean  S.D.  Min    Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Solution implementation 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00                
2. Deliberative interaction 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 -0.03               
3. Disagreement 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.16 -0.03              
4. Deliberative and non-in-
disagreement 0.58 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.41 -0.87             
5. Non-deliberative and non-in-
disagreement 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 -0.01 -0.76 -0.20 -0.31            
6. Deliberative and in-disagreement 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00 -0.20 0.24 0.90 -0.79 -0.18           
7. Previous successful engagements 0.40 0.78 0.00 3.00 -0.14 0.18 0.34 -0.26 -0.14 0.40          
8. Total engagements 2.91 1.83 0.00 8.00 -0.01 0.18 0.16 -0.17 0.01 0.30 0.41         
9. Past shareholder resolutions 4.11 4.13 0.00 19.00 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 0.00 0.15 -0.04 0.08 -0.31        
10. Media attention to protests (log) 0.17 0.58 0.00 2.79 -0.22 0.10 0.14 -0.10 -0.08 0.18 0.10 -0.01 0.35       
11. Reputation decline -0.02 0.75 -2.00 2.00 0.21 0.08 -0.23 0.22 0.01 -0.17 -0.26 -0.33 0.21 0.12      
12. Past company media attention 4.73 1.39 2.30 6.93 -0.23 -0.09 -0.16 0.07 0.19 -0.13 -0.04 -0.05 0.49 0.38 0.09     
13. Progressive corporate culture 1.36 1.18 0.00 4.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.04 0.09 -0.12 -0.02 0.23 0.10 0.51    
14. Firm environmental proactivity 2.17 1.46 0.00 5.00 -0.10 -0.30 -0.41 0.22 0.34 -0.44 -0.14 -0.14 0.22 -0.04 0.11 0.61 0.32   
15. Environmental theme 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.09 -0.18 -0.02 -0.14 0.31 0.02 0.24 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.01 -0.09 0.15 0.02  
16. Social theme 0.31 0.47 0.00 1.00 -0.30 0.08 0.10 -0.01 -0.18 0.07 -0.04 -0.21 -0.04 0.12 -0.24 0.07 0.08 0.16 -0.34 
17. Governance theme 0.49 0.51 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.06 -0.08 0.12 -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 0.05 -0.03 -0.12 0.21 0.00 -0.19 -0.16 -0.49 
18. Firm size (log) 11.20 2.34 7.84 23.82 -0.27 0.04 -0.11 0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.02 -0.13 0.64 0.52 0.15 0.56 0.28 0.18 -0.01 
19. Cash flow 0.10 0.13 -0.39 0.25 -0.11 -0.07 -0.19 0.11 0.14 -0.17 0.23 -0.26 0.17 0.01 -0.07 0.18 -0.05 0.22 -0.08 
20. R&D 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.16 -0.24 0.32 -0.18 -0.23 -0.14 -0.09 -0.25 -0.23 0.14 0.10 0.43 0.20 -0.05 
 16 17 18 19 20               
17. Governance theme -0.66                   
18. Firm size (log) -0.01 0.02                  
19. Cash flow 0.26 -0.18 -0.09                 
20. R&D 0.24 -0.18 0.00    -0.03                
Note. The table reports correlations among variables for Model 2’s sub-sample. The sub-sample for Model 2 is constituted by engagements that achieved 
milestones 3 and 4, i.e., engagements to which corporations responded by developing a credible strategy to address the issue of concern and by implementing the 
strategy, respectively. The final sample is constituted by 41 ESG engagements with 27 unique firms during the years 2008–2012. 




Table 4: Second-Stage Heckman Logit Models on Shareholder Engagement Milestones 
Variables DV: Solution development DV: Solution implementation Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
Deliberative interaction  1.717 0.752  -0.379 1.422 
  (1.254) (1.343)  (1.226) (1.649) 
Disagreement  -1.702 -4.014*  -3.397+ 0.993 
  (1.513) (1.835)  (1.838) (2.385) 
Deliberative interaction x   3.452+   -5.898* 
Disagreement   (2.020)   (2.776) 
Previous successful engagements -0.868 -0.593 -0.747 -0.481 0.956 1.013 
 (0.723) (0.899) (0.944) (0.982) (1.346) (1.350) 
Total engagements 0.065 -0.001 -0.082 0.216 -0.098 -0.020 
 (0.158) (0.163) (0.153) (0.464) (0.620) (0.424) 
Past shareholder resolutions  0.006 0.037 -0.032 0.181 0.349 0.401+ 
 (0.131) (0.145) (0.160) (0.250) (0.255) (0.230) 
Media attention to protests (log) 0.254 0.678 1.552    
 (0.982) (1.038) (1.284)    
Reputation decline -0.141 -0.367 -0.594 0.394 0.247 0.295 
 (0.391) (0.452) (0.445) (0.698) (0.876) (0.875) 
Past company media attention 0.335 0.032 0.045 -0.563 -0.942 -0.878 
 (0.339) (0.367) (0.374) (1.004) (1.077) (1.072) 
Firm progressive corporate culture 0.253 0.431 0.183 0.478 1.060 1.258 
 (0.364) (0.514) (0.459) (0.951) (0.955) (0.829) 
Firm environmental proactivity -0.613 -0.417 -0.057 -0.029 -0.604 -0.745+ 
 (0.416) (0.409) (0.447) (0.387) (0.455) (0.423) 
Environmental theme -0.801 -1.293 -1.582 1.852 -0.040 -0.741 
 (1.059) (1.363) (1.458) (1.666) (2.586) (3.004) 
Governance theme -2.421* -2.453* -2.614* 1.868 1.129 0.391 
 (1.015) (1.139) (1.112) (1.372) (1.755) (2.091) 
Firm size (log) -0.263* -0.365** -0.364** -0.426 -0.243 -0.199 
 (0.116) (0.128) (0.137) (0.424) (0.524) (0.555) 
Cash flow 1.305 0.854 0.500 0.559 -6.684 -7.864 
 (2.893) (2.763) (2.601) (3.591) (6.103) (6.509) 
R&D expenses -30.956 -50.573* -48.114+ 14.605 10.643 -5.033 
 (18.974) (25.255) (24.847) (18.477) (21.674) (25.232) 
Mining Target  1.376 1.511 1.479 -1.013 -0.674 0.248 
 (1.219) (1.123) (1.135) (1.504) (1.584) (1.804) 
Manufacturing Target 1.053 0.724 0.332 -0.050 0.091 0.886 
 (1.254) (1.434) (1.515) (1.142) (1.044) (1.310) 
Selection correction effect λ3 -0.188 0.815 0.292 -0.180 3.915 5.034 
 (1.304) (1.719) (1.801) (1.903) (2.959) (3.372) 
Constant 4.990* 6.920* 7.830** 3.349 5.152 3.087 
 (2.326) (2.830) (2.622) (3.452) (4.849) (5.559) 
Observations 62 62 62 41 41 41 
Log pseudo-likelihood -28.30 -25.77 -24.96 -22.61 -21.09 -19.99 
Pseudo R2 0.339 0.399 0.418 0.176 0.231 0.271 
Note. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 




Table 5: Sequential Logit Model on Shareholder Engagement Milestones  
Variables DV: Solution development DV: Solution implementation Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 
Deliberative interaction  2.191+ 1.120  -0.089 1.366 
  (1.145) (1.294)  (1.126) (1.380) 
Disagreement  -1.587 -4.243*  -0.996 2.650 
  (1.266) (1.756)  (1.280) (1.977) 
Deliberative interaction x   3.617+   -4.379* 
Disagreement   (1.966)   (1.961) 
Previous successful engagements -0.756 -0.672 -0.672 -0.546 -0.386 -0.567 
 (0.577) (0.611) (0.631) (0.685) (0.765) (0.800) 
Total engagements 0.077 -0.004 -0.087 0.265 0.256 0.360 
 (0.161) (0.151) (0.154) (0.442) (0.448) (0.376) 
Past shareholder resolutions  0.069 0.073 0.036 0.244 0.242 0.261 
 (0.130) (0.161) (0.171) (0.203) (0.200) (0.189) 
Media attention to protests (log) 0.240 1.265 1.932*    
 (0.872) (0.951) (0.935)    
Reputation decline -0.109 -0.361 -0.619 0.439 0.391 0.366 
 (0.412) (0.445) (0.440) (0.686) (0.766) (0.752) 
Past company media attention 0.465 0.350 0.265 -0.101 -0.225 -0.104 
 (0.336) (0.375) (0.377) (0.968) (1.008) (1.116) 
Firm progressive corporate culture 0.338 0.435 0.268 0.283 0.409 0.505 
 (0.381) (0.499) (0.492) (0.754) (0.719) (0.666) 
Firm environmental proactivity -0.611 -0.369 0.037 0.175 -0.060 -0.113 
 (0.436) (0.456) (0.513) (0.347) (0.494) (0.462) 
Environmental theme -0.805 -0.878 -1.343 1.816 1.780 1.963 
 (0.987) (1.207) (1.464) (1.571) (1.729) (1.916) 
Governance theme -2.413** -1.960+ -2.327* 1.826 2.001+ 1.983 
 (0.930) (1.058) (1.160) (1.138) (1.205) (1.387) 
Firm size (log) -0.236* -0.366*** -0.355** -0.142 -0.245 -0.189 
 (0.103) (0.111) (0.119) (0.203) (0.221) (0.224) 
Cash flow 1.835 2.370 1.468 0.714 -0.365 0.195 
 (3.655) (3.977) (3.836) (2.831) (3.334) (3.493) 
R&D expenses -33.738+ -56.739* -55.006* 16.631 17.467 8.341 
 (19.010) (23.684) (25.315) (18.308) (21.215) (23.134) 
Mining Target  1.170 1.085 0.913 -0.440 -0.473 0.153 
 (1.415) (1.153) (1.188) (1.254) (1.292) (1.557) 
Manufacturing Target 0.990 0.865 0.259 -0.151 0.232 0.970 
 (1.168) (1.359) (1.374) (0.732) (0.926) (1.078) 
Selection correction effect λ3 1.036 1.794 1.808 2.399 1.777 2.146 
 (2.014) (2.490) (2.337) (1.703) (2.059) (2.248) 
Constant 1.482 0.937 2.193 -8.261 -4.596 -8.375 
 (6.366) (7.673) (7.750) (7.931) (10.628) (12.032) 
Observations 169 169 169 169 169 169 
Log pseudo-likelihood -144.06 -138.56 -137.61 -182.15 -175.25 -174.32 
Note. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 





Figure 1: A Three-stage Process of Shareholder Dialogue 
 
Figure 2: Mapping the Investor’s Engagement Milestones and our Theoretical Model 
 




Figure 3: The Effect of Deliberative Interaction and Disagreement on Solution 
Development 
 
Note. Predicted probability of the engagement progressing to the solution-development milestone, when 
deliberative interaction and disagreement range to one standard deviation below/above their means. 
  




Figure 4: The Effect of Deliberative Interaction and Disagreement on Solution 
Implementation 
 
Note. Predicted probability of the engagement progressing to the solution-implementation milestone, when 
deliberative interaction and disagreement range to one standard deviation below/above their means. 
